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Reporting conditionals with modals  
Magdalena Sztencel (York St John University)  
Sarah E. Duffy (Northumbria University) 
 
Abstract 
Conditionals and modals work in tandem in some instances of practical reasoning, or decision 
making. Consider the following example (from Kratzer 2012): 
a. I want to become a mayor. 
b. (q) I will become a mayor only if (p) I go to the pub. 
c. Therefore, I should go to the pub.   
Given what the cogniser wants (a) and the relevant circumstances (b), the conclusion that the 
cogniser goes to the pub comes out as necessary. Hence, the presence of the necessity modal 
should in (c). Indeed, given the context of (a), the necessity modal in (c) is simply a reflection 
of the necessity of p for q, which is overtly represented by the use of the ‘only if p, q’ 
construction. This chapter looks into whether indirect reports of conditionals – in particular, 
indirect reports which involve the use of a modal verb – are sensitive to the necessity of p for 
q in cases where necessity is not overtly represented in a conditional, as in ‘if p, q’ 
formulations.  
We report on two online experiments into the relation between (i) perceived necessity 
or sufficiency of the truth of a conditional antecedent for the truth of the consequent, and (ii) 
the formulation of an indirect report of a conditional with necessity or possibility modals 
(have to, should, could). In Experiment 1, the ‘necessity/sufficiency of p for q’ variable was 
manipulated by contextually altering the number of alternative antecedents (e.g. Cummins et 
al. 1991; Thompson 1994; Politzer 2003). It was found that modals used in indirect reports of 
‘if p, q’ conditionals co-vary with the number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways. 
This suggests that modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals may be a diagnostic 
for biconditional versus material interpretations of conditionals. The aim of Experiment 2 
was to find out whether the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated in contexts which 
lower/eliminate the believability of the conditionals. It was found that manipulating the 
believability variable has no reliable effect on the results.  
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1. Introduction 
An indirect speech report is an event e’ which transmits knowledge about some prior event e 
(e.g. Capone 2013, 2016). In particular, in an indirect report a reporting speaker S’ uses an 
utterance U’ to report on the utterance U made by the original, or reported, speaker S. The 
choice of U’ by S’ is sensitive to the (cognitive) context of U and U’ and, all things being 
equal, results in a belief attribution by the hearer of the indirect report (H’) to S (e.g. Wilson 
2000; Capone 2016; Cummins 2016).  
For S’ to succeed in transmitting knowledge about e to H’, the relation between U and 
U’ in indirect reports needs to be that of pragmatic same-saying; that is, U and U’ need not be 
the same in terms of linguistic form, but they need to (sufficiently, for the purposes of the 
current exchange) match in terms of contextually-accessible level of speaker meaning (e.g. 
Cresswell 2000; Capone 2013, 2016; Wieland 2016).   
In this chapter, we look at whether modalised indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals 
are sensitive to the contextually-accessible necessity versus sufficiency of p for q. If 
pragmatic same-saying is at stake in the formulation of U’, then we should observe a 
correlation between, on the one hand, (i) perceived necessity or sufficiency of the truth of a 
conditional antecedent for the truth of the consequent, and, on the other, (ii) the formulation 
of an indirect report of a conditional with necessity or possibility modals (have to, should, 
could). We also look at whether there is a correlation between (i) and (ii) in contexts in which 
it is assumed that S’ is not sure about or does not believe in the truth of U. The results of this 
experiment will shed light on whether a communicatively successful indirect report – i.e. one 
in which knowledge about e is transmitted to H’ – is necessarily tantamount to a belief 
attribution by H’ to S.  
 
2. Conditionals and modals 
It is well known that conditionals and modals are related (e.g. Clancy et al. 1997; Beller 
2008; Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010; Schulz 2010; Kratzer 2012; Over et al. 2013; 
Krzyżanowska et al. 2013). This relationship is most obvious in the so-called explicitly 
modalised conditionals, where a modal expression is (typically) present in the consequent 
clause of the conditional. Kratzer (2012: 28) argues that the antecedent clauses of modalised 
conditionals often serve to restrict such modal expressions. Consider the following: 
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1) If a wolf entered the house, he must have eaten grandma, since she was bedridden. He 
might have eaten the girl with the red cap, too. In fact, that’s rather likely. The poor 
little thing wouldn’t have been able to defend herself.  
The first sentence in example (1) shows that the if-clause can restrict the modal expression 
overtly represented in the consequent of the same conditional sentence (here: must). The 
successive sentences in this example show that the if-clause can also restrict modal 
expressions in subsequent discourse (here: might, rather likely, and would).   
 However, if-clauses can also restrict a modal which is not overtly represented in the 
consequent, as illustrated by the following example (from Zvolenszky 2002, cited in Kratzer 
2012: 106): 
2) If Britney Spears drinks Coke in public, she must drink Coke in public.  
The most natural interpretation of (2) is one in which, if Britney Spears drinks Coke in 
public, then it must be the case that she must/is obliged to drink Coke in public. This 
interpretation involves both epistemic (must be the case that) and deontic (must/is obliged to) 
modalities. This indicates that example (2) is doubly modalised even though only one of the 
modals is overtly represented in the sentence.  
 The relation between conditionality and modality is also evidenced by some instances 
of practical reasoning, or decision making. Kratzer (2012: 62) considers the following 
example: 
3) a. I want to become a mayor. 
b. I will become a mayor only if I go to the pub. 
c. Therefore, I should go to the pub.   
Kratzer argues that there are two types of hidden assumptions which underlie this line of 
reasoning: (i) a modal base, which is ‘a function f that maps a world w to the set of 
propositions that correspond to the relevant circumstances in w’; and (ii) an ordering source, 
which ‘maps a possible world w to the set of propositions that correspond to what I want in 
w’. In example (3), the relevant circumstances are such that I will become a mayor only if I go 
to the pub and what I want is to become a mayor. With respect to this particular modal base 
and ordering source, the proposition that I go to the pub is necessary. On the assumption that 
should is a necessity modal (Kratzer 2012: 62), the modal base and ordering source analysis 
dictates the formulation of the conclusion in (3) with should.
1
      
                                                          
1
 If necessity is at stake here, a formulation with must or have to would be equally acceptable. 
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The relation between the type of modality (necessity or possibility) which arises from 
the modal base and ordering source, on the one hand, and the modal expression used in the 
formulation of the conclusion, on the other, brings us to the subject matter of the current 
chapter. In Kratzer’s example, this relation is obvious: the relevant circumstances are such 
that the truth of p (I go to the pub) is necessary for the truth of q (I will become a mayor) and, 
indeed, this necessity is overtly represented by the use of only if in (3b).
2
 Hence, the choice of 
a necessity modal, like should.  
However, necessity need not be overt in the formulation of the antecedent, yet it will 
influence the choice of the formulation of the conclusion in practical reasoning. For example, 
let us imagine that a researcher wants to falsify his colleague’s hypothesis and speculates 
that, if (p) he runs a search on a mega corpus of data, then (q) it is likely that his colleague’s 
hypothesis will be falsified. The researcher has always found the corpus method reliable and 
he assumes that, given that the corpus contains hundreds of millions of language use samples, 
it very likely contains some counter-examples to his colleague’s hypothesis. Given this 
assumption, the researcher then decides that he should run a search on a mega corpus of data. 
But notice that if there are other sufficient guarantors of the truth of q in the example above, 
like using the methods of introspection or experimentation, then the researcher would decide 
that he could, rather than should, run a search on a mega corpus of data.
3
 If, however, the 
researcher happens to believe that experimentation is not a suitable method to test this 
particular hypothesis and if introspection has failed him in the past, he can even decide that 
he has to run a search on a mega corpus of data. So the choice of a modal in the formulation 
of the conclusion depends on a relevant slice of cognitive context. 
 
3. Indirect reports of conditionals 
Let us now transform some of the above instances of practical reasoning into instances of 
indirect reports of conditionals.  
Imagine a scenario in which Anna wants to become a mayor. She asks her politically 
involved friend, Mary, what to do to become a mayor.  
Mary says to Anna:  
                                                          
2
 We assume that, if a linguistic form overtly represents a concept, that concept is an attractor for that particular 
linguistic form, in the dynamic sense of Barsalou 2005 or Sztencel 2014 and Sztencel 2018 (see also Barsalou et 
al. 2010; Lebois et al. 2014).  
3
 The choice between could or should here is independent of the modal expression (likely) which is restricted by 
the if-clause in that, regardless of whether the researcher feels he should or could run the search, he still believes 
it is likely that the hypothesis will be falsified if he does run the search. However, the choice of could p or 
should p as opposed to e.g. will not p is dependent on the presence of likely in the consequent. 
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4) You will become a mayor only if you go to the pub.  
Anna wants to tell her husband, John, what Mary has said. Which of the following sentences 
would Anna be most likely to use? 
a) Mary said that I could go to the pub if I want to become a mayor. 
b) Mary said that I should go to the pub if I want to become a mayor. 
c) Mary said that I have to go to the pub if I want to become a mayor. 
Given the only if formulation (i.e. overtly represented necessity), and the representation of the 
ordering source in the antecedents of the reporting conditionals, (b) and (c) seem to be the 
only possible choices. But what is the difference between them, if any? 
 Let us leave conditionals for a moment and consider the following two injunctions: 
5) You have to do X. 
6) You should do X.  
It is plausible to assume that the speakers of (5) and (6) both believe that it is necessary for 
the hearer to do X; that according to some set of circumstances in the world, there is no other 
alternative but to do X. In other words, it is plausible to assume that in the case of have to in 
(5) and should in (6) we are dealing with root necessity (see e.g. Depraetere & Reed 2006).  
But there is a difference between the two modal expressions. In its root use, have to 
do X tends to indicate an obligation to do X or the existence of compelling reasons to do X. 
Crucially, when have to do X is used with the force of an injunction, there is an expectation 
that the hearer will do X (Palmer 2001). In contrast, when root should is used with the force 
of an injunction, there is no expectation that the hearer will do X (Coates 1983; Palmer 2001). 
Due to the lack of such expectation, the types of injunctions that can be made with should are 
said to communicate weak obligation (as compared with have to do X or must do X) or strong 
suggestion/advice (as compared with could do X). What this means is that the use of should 
allows one to communicate the necessity of doing X without placing/appearing to place an 
obligation on the hearer to do X; the use of should, thus, allows the speaker to mitigate a 
threat to the hearer’s negative face-want (as in Brown & Levinson 1987).4, 5 
                                                          
4
 See Geis & Lycan (1993) on conditional formulations and politeness strategies.  
5
 Notice that the use of ‘weak’ in ‘weak obligation’ is not the same as use of ‘weak’ in ‘weak necessity’ as in 
e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou (2008). Von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) define strong necessity modals (e.g. must) as 
those which require the prejacent (i.e. the proposition X in must X) to be true in all of the favoured worlds 
(worlds in the modal base which are most highly ranked by the ordering source), while weak necessity modals 
(e.g. ought to) require the prejacent (X in ought to X) to be true in all of the very best (by some additional 
measure) among the favoured worlds. Given the facework strategy which dictates the use of should over have 
to, it transpires that should can be used to communicate weak obligation to do X in the presence of strong 
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Coming back to our scenario in (4), the use of only if by Mary licenses Anna to use 
either of the two necessity modals – should or have to – in her report. Arguably, if Anna 
chose the should formulation of the report, this wouldn’t be because she wanted to mitigate 
the threat to her own negative face-want (but it is, in principle, a possible reason). More 
plausibly, the choice of should by Anna would be indicative of Anna’s ascription of 
politeness intentions to Mary: Anna chooses should because she assumes that Mary would 
intend to mitigate the threat to Anna’s negative face. 
And what about the could formulation? According to Depraetere & Reed (2006), 
could can be used to communicate root possibility, one which arises due to some set of 
circumstances in the world, a.k.a. enabling and disabling conditions (see also Kratzer 2012). 
This means that could can be used to make suggestions (Palmer 2001), but not strong 
suggestions as was the case with should. Given the necessity of p in example (4), which is 
overtly represented by the use of only if, the formulation with a possibility modal like could is 
inadequate.  
Let us now go back to our research methods scenarios invoked above and imagine 
that researcher A wonders what method is most likely to falsify his colleague’s hypothesis. 
He asks his friend, researcher B, for advice. B tells A that experimentation is not a suitable 
method in this case and that introspection has failed B on many occasions in the past. B then 
says:  
7) If you run a search on a mega corpus of data, you will likely falsify the hypothesis.   
A wants to tell C what B has said. Which of the following sentences would A be most likely 
to use?  
a) B said that I could run a search on a mega corpus of data, if I want to falsify 
the hypothesis.  
b) B said that I should run a search on a mega corpus of data, if I want to falsify 
the hypothesis. 
c) B said that I have to run a search on a mega corpus of data, if I want to falsify 
the hypothesis. 
Example (7) differs from (4) in that the necessity of p for q is not overtly represented; the 
conditional formulation is ‘if p, q’, not ‘only if p, q’. Nevertheless, it is evident from the 
context that the corpus method is the only suitable method according to researcher B. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
necessity to do X – example (5) is a case in point. This is not inconsistent with von Fintel & Iatridou (2008), 
who remain ‘officially agnostic’ about should (p.117). 
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light of the contextually provided domain restriction (necessity of the corpus method), 
formulation (a) is impossible. As was the case with example (4), formulation (b) is given 
preference to (c) given the facework considerations.   
Compare the above scenario with one in which researcher E wonders what method is 
most likely to falsify his colleague’s hypothesis. He asks his friend, researcher F, for advice. 
F tells E that there are a few methods which are equally likely to falsify the hypothesis, such 
as introspection, a mega-corpus study or experimentation. F then says:   
8) If you run a search on a mega corpus of data, you will likely falsify the hypothesis.  
E wants to tell G what F has said. Which of the following sentences would E be most likely 
to use?   
a) F said that I could run a search on a mega corpus of data, if I want to falsify 
the hypothesis.  
b) F said that I should run a search on a mega corpus of data, if I want to falsify 
the hypothesis. 
c) F said that I have to run a search on a mega corpus of data, if I want to falsify 
the hypothesis. 
Given the contextually provided domain restriction (two other alternatives), (a) is the most 
likely candidate. Formulation (b) seems likely on the assumption that E equates F’s 
conditional with F’s eventual choice of the corpus method as the preferred option and 
unlikely if E makes no such equation. This indicates that the use of should X is also consistent 
with the lack of necessity of X, or lack of strong necessity if you will (see footnote 5). Notice 
that from F’s eventual choice of the corpus method as the preferred option, it does not follow 
that F thinks that the use of corpus is necessary. F may have advised E to use corpus because 
F thinks – though is not sure – that E might be a bit more likely to get funding for a corpus-
based research or that E is more familiar with this method than with the others and therefore 
it will be easier for E to do the research. One or both of these two additional considerations, 
the funding or the ease of research consideration, may contribute an additional, yet tentative 
(notice F’s lack of certainty), constraint and thus result in the preference of should over 
could. Another option, given F’s lack of certainty, would be to see the effect of the additional 
constraint as allowing the grading of alternatives into better and worse (Kratzer’s discussion 
of kann is relevant here, see 2012: 60) – the choice of should p would indicate that p is a 
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better alternative out of a set of others, but p is not necessary. Formulation (c) seems 
impossible given the provided domain restriction which calls upon other alternatives.   
 What this section has illustrated is that the formulation of the indirect report of a 
conditional can be a diagnostic for ‘the relevant circumstances in w’ in that it depends on the 
assumptions about ‘the relevant circumstances in w’. In particular, the formulation of the 
indirect report depends on whether the truth of p is assumed to be necessary or not necessary 
for the truth of q – regardless of whether necessity is or is not overtly represented in the if-
clause. We have argued that should and have to formulations can be used when the truth of p 
is assumed to be necessary for the truth of q, and we have suggested that should is likely to be 
preferred due to the facework considerations. We have also argued that could can be used 
when the truth of p is assumed not to be necessary for the truth of q. Should is also a possible 
candidate for multiple-alternatives contexts, but only when an additional constraint is 
considered. Nevertheless, we predict that should will not be a preferred option here due to its 
association with (strong) necessity.  
 
4. Relevant circumstances in w = alternative antecedents  
Consider the following examples (taken from Cummins et al. 1991): 
9) a. If the match was struck, then it lit. 
b. The match was struck. 
c. Therefore it lit. 
10) a. If Joe cut his finger, then it bled. 
b. Joe cut his finger. 
c. Therefore it bled.   
Cummins et al. (1991) and Cummins (1995) demonstrate that the acceptance rate of the 
conclusion (c) in the inferences above depends on the domain referred to by a causal 
conditional: people are more likely to accept the conclusion of (10) than (9). This acceptance 
rate depends on the number of disabling conditions, i.e. events which could prevent the effect 
represented in the consequent from occurring; the match won’t light if it is damp, if treated in 
some other way that would prevent it from lighting or if insufficient pressure is applied to it 
and Joe’s finger won’t bleed if the cut is superficial. The number of disabling conditions is in 
inverse proportion to the acceptability of the conclusion: the more disabling conditions, the 
less certainty in the sufficiency of the truth of (b) for the truth of (c).    
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Now, we must be careful here not to assume that Cummins et al.’s results tell us about 
the rates of acceptability of the conclusion in the Modus Ponens inference (i.e. ((pq) & p)  
q). If a person accepts/assumes the truth of the major premise (10a)/(pq) and 
accepts/assumes the truth of (10b)/p, then the truth of (10c)/q is guaranteed. This is because 
the (assumption of the) truth of the major premise guarantees the assumption of the 
sufficiency of the truth of the antecedent for the truth of the consequent. What the existence 
of disabling conditions seems to be doing here then is reduce the believability of – i.e. the 
acceptability of the truth of – the major premise (given the disabling conditions, the cogniser 
accepts that the finger may bleed, but not that it will bleed) and consequently the 
acceptability of the conclusion (c) from premise (b) (for short, acceptability of (b) → (c)). 
But it does not affect the acceptability of the conclusion in the Modus Ponens argument, 
which requires the assumption of the truth of the major premise.
6
 The more disabling 
conditions there are, the less believable the major premise is.  
Politzer (2003, 2004) uses the notion of complementary necessary conditions (CNCs) 
to refer to two kinds of implicit ceteris paribus assumptions on which the satisfaction of q 
depends. The first kind is called a disabler and it corresponds to Cummins’ notion of a 
disabling condition (a disabler cannot be the case for q to be the case). The second kind is an 
enabler. An enabler must be the case for q to be the case; in (9) an example of an enabler 
would be that sufficient pressure is applied during the striking of the match and in (10) that 
Joe’s finger is not prosthetic. According to Politzer (2003), the rate of endorsement of Modus 
Ponens (and Modus Tollens) decreases in three situations: (i) when the satisfaction of a CNC 
is denied (i.e. when a disabler is present or an enabler absent); (ii) when a doubt on the 
satisfaction of a CNC is suggested; and (iii) when it is stated or known that the CNC is not 
fully satisfied. However, as discussed above, it is more plausible to assume that a denial of or 
doubt in the satisfaction of a CNC – what will be referred to as a dubious CNC state – results 
in a decreased believability of the major premise (Modus Ponens simply does not go through 
in dubious CNC states as the truth of the major premise is not accepted/assumed).    
 Whereas dubious CNC states seem to cast doubt on the believability of the major 
premise, alternative causes, i.e. causes other than the one represented in the antecedent which 
                                                          
6
 Cummins (1995) studies causal, rather than logical, necessity and sufficiency and finds the effect of reversal of 
the causal relation on the believability of the major premise (even though she talks of the effect on the rates of 
acceptance of the logical arguments such as Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens).  
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are capable of making q true, seem to cast doubt on the necessity of p for q.
7
 Consider the 
following examples: 
11) a. If the brake was depressed, then the car slowed down.  
b. The break was depressed. 
c. The car slowed down. 
12) a. If Larry grasped the glass with his bare fingertips, then his fingertips were on it. 
b. Larry grasped the glass with his bare fingertips. 
c. His fingertips were on it. 
According to Cummins, there are many alternative causes for the conclusion (c) in (11), like 
going uphill or engine trouble. However, the conclusion (c) in (12) admits of few alternative 
causes. This difference in the number of alternative causes results in the variation in the 
acceptability of the inference from the observed effect (c) to the cause represented in the 
antecedent (b) (i.e. (c) → (b)). Thus, it appears that the more alternative causes there are, the 
less certainty there is about the necessity of the truth of p for the truth of q.  
Thompson (1994), who investigates both causal and non-causal conditionals, argues 
that the acceptability of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences also depends on the 
availability of alternative consequents. Consider the following example:   
13) a. If a person smokes, then he/she will get lung cancer. 
b. A person smokes. 
c. He/she will get lung cancer. 
As above, if A rejects that (13c) follows from (13b), A cannot have assumed the truth of the 
major premise, the assumption of which would guarantee the sufficiency of (13b) for (13c). 
So what A rejects is not a conclusion in the Modus Ponens argument. As was the case with 
the number of disabling conditions, it transpires that what the number of alternative 
consequents does is affect the believability of the major premise. Crucial here is the 
difference between the proposition that If a person smokes, then he/she will get lung cancer, 
which is the major premise here, and the proposition that If a person smokes, then he/she may 
get lung cancer, which licences the rejection of (b) → (c) but is not our major premise. The 
                                                          
7
 In the examples (9)–(12), the direction of causal sufficiency and necessity corresponds to the 
sufficiency/necessity of p for q. If, however, the antecedents and consequents of (9)–(12) were reversed, causal 
sufficiency/necessity (but not inferential sufficiency/necessity) would correspond to the sufficiency/necessity of 
q for p (see Cummins 1995). We use p and q to refer to the antecedents and consequents of the conditionals 
under discussion, irrespective of the direction of causal sufficiency/necessity (though they happen to 
correspond).  
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alternative consequent to the one in (13a) is that the person will not get lung cancer. The 
existence of this alternative consequent lowers the believability of the major premise.  
In light of the overview above, a believable conditional, i.e. one whose major premise 
is believable, is one for which the CNCs are satisfied and for which there are no alternative 
consequents. This is in line with Politzer’s (2004) analysis whereby the credibility of a 
conditional is in inverse proportion to the number of CNCs whose satisfaction is 
questionable. If a conditional is believable, then the existence of no (reasonable, salient, etc.) 
alternative antecedents should result in the perceived necessity of p for q, i.e. in the 
biconditional (pq) interpretation of conditionals. On the other hand, the existence of 
alternative antecedents should maintain the presumption of the sufficiency of p for q and 
result in the material (pq) interpretation of conditionals (see also Thompson 1994, 1995, 
2000; von Fintel 2012).   
We propose to treat the alternative antecedents variable as ‘the relevant 
circumstances in w’ which determine the perception of sufficiency versus necessity of p for q. 
If, as we put forward at the end of section 3, indirect reports of conditionals are a diagnostic 
for ‘the relevant circumstances in w’, then the formulation choices of indirect reports should 
be sensitive to the number of alternative antecedents. In section 3, we predicted that the 
existence of alternative antecedents should favour the formulation of the indirect report with 
could (the scenario in which experimentation and introspection were as good methods of 
testing a given hypothesis as a corpus study was), whereas no alternative antecedents (the 
scenario in which neither experimentation nor introspection were alternatives to a corpus 
study) should favour a formulation of the indirect report with should over have to (on the 
assumption of the facework considerations). We have devised an online experiment to test 
this hypothesis.    
 
5. Experiment 1 
The aim of the experiment was to find out whether modalised formulations of indirect reports 
of conditionals reflect the number of alternative antecedents. To do this, we devised a series 
of scenarios, similar to those in section 3, where the number of alternative antecedents was 
contextually manipulated. We have followed Politzer (2004: 105) in assuming that the 
conditional comes with an implicit guarantee of normality. In light of section 3, the guarantee 
of normality has two clauses. First, unless the satisfaction of relevant CNCs is 
denied/doubted or it is suggested/ known/stated that the satisfaction of relevant CNCs is or 
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should be denied/doubted, the credibility, or believability, of a conditional is high. Second, 
unless the absence of alternative consequents is denied/doubted or it is suggested/ 
known/stated that the absence of alternative consequents is or should be denied/doubted, the 
credibility, or believability, of a conditional is high.  
The conditionals chosen for Experiment 1 were believable in the above sense in that 
the lack of satisfaction of relevant CNCs or the presence of alternative consequents was not 
suggested/stated in the co-text. Other contextual features which increase believability of the 
chosen conditionals are discussed later on in this section. 
 
5.1. Method 
Participants 
139 native English speakers participated in this study (35 in Scenario 1A; 35 in Scenario 2A; 
33 in Scenario 3A; 36 in Scenario 4A). 104 participants were female, 32 were male, and 3 
were non-binary. There was an age range of 18 to 74 years and a mean age of 30 years. 
Participants were recruited online via social media postings. No participant had studied 
linguistics or philosophy beyond MA level. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The participants were working under one of two experimental conditions: Condition I, where 
there were several alternative antecedents mentioned in the co-text, and Condition II, where 
there were no alternative antecedents mentioned in the co-text. For each condition two 
scenarios were created, one involving conditional advice and the other a conditional 
inducement. The study comprised of four surveys (corresponding to the four scenarios), 
which were created using Google Forms. The social media postings advertising the study 
contained hyperlinks to each survey. Participants were instructed to take part in just one of 
the surveys.   
On the opening page, participants were informed that the study formed part of a larger 
investigation into the reporting of other people’s speech. Following informed consent, 
participants proceeded onto the second page, where they were presented with one test 
question: 
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Condition I: several alternative antecedents  
Scenario 1A: Paul wants to buy his friend, Mary, a birthday present. He decides to consult 
Mary’s sister, Joanne. Joanne tells Paul about the many hobbies that Mary has, such as good 
literature, classical music, horse-riding, and hiking. She then says to John: 
If you buy Mary a good book, she’ll be happy.  
Paul wants to tell Frank, his roommate, what Joanne said. Which of the following sentences 
would Paul be most likely to use? You can tick more than one if you feel it’s appropriate – if 
so, please indicate your first/second/third choice.  
a) Joanne said that I could buy Mary a book if I want to make her happy. 
b) Joanne said that I should buy Mary a book if I want to make her happy. 
c) Joanne said that I have to buy Mary a book if I want to make her happy. 
Scenario 2A: Tom is at his Grandma’s and he’s looking for a way to earn £5. Grandma tells 
Tom that there are many things he could do to earn £5, such as vacuuming, doing the laundry, 
doing the dishes, mowing the lawn or doing the shopping. She then says to Tom: 
If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you £5. 
Tom wants to tell his mum what Grandma said. Which of the following sentences would Tom 
be most likely to use? You can select more than one if you think it’s appropriate – if so, 
please indicate your first/second/third choices. 
a) Grandma said that I could mow the lawn if I want to earn £5. 
b) Grandma said that I should mow the lawn if I want to earn £5. 
c) Grandma said that I have to mow the lawn if I want to earn £5. 
Condition II: no alternative antecedents  
Scenario 3A: Little Bill is irritated. He’s kept a pot of water near the fire for an hour, 
thinking that the water would boil. But it didn’t. His mum says: 
If you heat the water up to 100°C – which is 212°F –, it’ll boil.  
Little Bill wants to tell his friend what his mum said. Which of the following sentences would 
Bill be most likely to use? You can select more than one if you think it’s appropriate – if so, 
please indicate your first/second/third choice. 
a) Mum said that I could heat the water up to 100°C/212°F if I want it to boil. 
b) Mum said that I should heat the water up to 100°C/212°F if I want it to boil. 
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c) Mum said that I have to heat the water up to 100°C/212°F if I want it to boil. 
Scenario 4A: A teenage girl wants to go out. Her father, annoyed with the constant mess in 
the girl’s room, says: 
If you clean your room, I’ll let you go out. 
The teenager is on the phone with her friend. She wants to tell her friend what her father said. 
Which of the following sentences would the teenager be most likely to use? You can select 
more than one if you think it’s appropriate – if so, please indicate your first/second/third 
choice. 
a) My father said that I could clean my room if I want to go out. 
b) My father said that I should clean my room if I want to go out. 
c) My father said that I have to clean my room if I want to go out 
Immediately below, participants provided their answer to the test question and any other 
comments which they might have (marked as optional). 
On the final page, participants provided demographic information: age, gender, native 
language(s), and country of residence. They then indicated whether or not they had studied 
linguistics and/or philosophy at university level and, if so, their highest level of study. All 
participants confirmed that they had taken part in just one of the surveys. 
 
Predictions 
In all scenarios, participants were presented with a could, should, or have to in the consequent 
and an overtly represented ordering source in the antecedent. The reporting verb say was used 
in all options as it is neutral with respect to the illocutionary point (Capone 2016).  
Both scenarios in Condition I foregrounded many alternative antecedents. As such, 
we predict a high preference for the could formulation in both of these scenarios.  
As for Condition II, in Scenario 3A, it is part of general knowledge that there are no 
alternative antecedents. On the assumption that the informants focus on the illocutionary act 
of the conditional (advice), we predict a high preference for the should formulation (in line 
with the facework strategies discussed in section 3). However, a combination of two factors – 
directness licensed by the dynamics of power relations between parents and children (e.g. 
Blum-Kulka 1990) and the general truth interpretation of this conditional – make available 
the have to formulation. In Scenario 4A, the father’s annoyance with his teenage daughter 
contextually suggests that there are no other alternatives either. Due to the father’s 
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annoyance, the assumption of an intention to mitigate the addressee’s negative face-want (the 
sensitivity to which would be evidenced by the choice of the should formulation) is likely to 
be suspended. Hence, the have to formulation is likely to be favoured.  
The conditionals used in this experiment were assumed to be generally believable for 
various contextually salient reasons. The first reason has to do with the default assumption of 
advice being given in good faith and an inducement being sincere in the absence of any 
indication to the contrary (cf. Gricean assumption that the speaker has spoken truly unless 
there is an indication to the contrary and Searle’s sincerity conditions). In Scenario 1A, this 
assumption was strengthened by the fact that Joanne is Mary’s sister and thus her advice is 
reliable and, in Scenario 2A, by choosing a grandmother, a stereotypically positive figure, as 
the speaker of the inducement. In Scenario 3A, the believability was strengthened by the fact 
that the boiling point of water is part of general knowledge, whereas, in Scenario 4A, the 
father’s annoyance at the constant mess in his daughter’s room further indicated that p was 
necessary for q.  
 
5.2. Results and discussion 
Condition I: material interpretation (Scenarios 1A and 2A) 
(i) Preferred response: In line with our predictions, a chi-square goodness of fit test revealed a 
reliable difference in preferred response to the question – i.e. could, should, or have to –
among participants responding to Scenario 1A (χ2 (2,35) = 22.69; p < 0.0001), as well as 
participants responding to Scenario 2A (χ2 (2,35) = 43.26; p < 0.0001) (see Table 1). 
Specifically, as predicted, for both scenarios, participants demonstrated a preference for the 
could formulation, which we attribute to the presence of several alternative antecedents and 
thus the lack of necessity of p for q.  
Table 1 
 could 
 
should have to 
Scenario 1A 65.7% 
 
34.3% 0.0% 
Scenario 2A 85.7% 
 
5.7% 8.6% 
 
16 
 
(ii) Multiple responses: As mentioned, participants were given the option of selecting more 
than one response if they thought it was appropriate. When doing so, they were asked to 
indicate their first/second/third choices. 
For Scenario 1A, the findings revealed that, in four instances where could was 
indicated as the preferred choice, should was selected as the second choice (and have to was 
also selected as the third choice in two of these instances). Moreover, in two instances where 
should was indicated at the preferred choice, could was selected as the second choice. Taken 
together, for Scenario 1A, there were six instances out of a possible 35 in which more than 
one response was deemed to be appropriate. 
  For Scenario 2A, the findings revealed that, in three instances where could was 
indicated as the preferred choice, should was selected as the second choice (and have to was 
also selected as the third choice in one of these instances). Thus, for Scenario 2A, there were 
three instances out of a possible 35 in which more than one response was deemed to be 
appropriate. 
Taken together, the results indicate a significant preference for the could formulation, 
which was predicted as a favoured choice for sufficiency contexts. However, the responses to 
Scenario 1A were more ambivalent than the responses to Scenario 2A. We attribute the 
should formulation choices in Scenario 1A to the participants’ interpretation of the 
conditional as Joanne’s eventual choice of getting Mary a book (p) as the preferred way (the 
better option) for John to make Mary happy (q); such an interpretation would presuppose an 
assumption, on part of the participants, that there is some additional constraint which is not 
mentioned in the context (but see section 7).  
 
Condition II: biconditional interpretation (Scenarios 3A and 4A) 
(i) Preferred response: In line with our predictions, a chi-square goodness of fit test revealed a 
reliable difference in preferred response to the question – i.e. could, should, or have to – 
among participants responding to Scenario 3A (χ2 (2,33) = 16.55; p < 0.001), as well as 
participants responding to Scenario 4A (χ2 (2,36) = 50.67; p < 0.0001) (see Table 2). 
Specifically, as predicted, for Scenario 3A, participants demonstrated a preference for the 
should formulation and, for Scenario 4A, participants demonstrated a preference for the have 
to formulation.  
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Table 2 
 could 
 
should have to 
Scenario 3A 0.0% 
 
51.5% 48.5% 
Scenario 4A 0.0% 
 
11.1% 88.9% 
 
(ii) Multiple responses: As mentioned, participants were given the option of selecting more 
than one response if they thought it was appropriate. When doing so, they were asked to 
indicate their first/second/third choices. 
For Scenario 3A, the findings revealed that, in eight instances where should was 
indicated as the preferred choice, have to was selected as the second choice. Moreover, in 
four instances where have to was indicated at the preferred choice, should was selected as the 
second choice (and could was also selected as the third choice in one of these instances). 
Taken together, for Scenario 3A, there were 12 instances out of a possible 33 in which more 
than one response was deemed to be appropriate. 
  For Scenario 4A, the findings revealed that, in three instances where have to was 
indicated as the preferred choice, should was selected as the second choice (and could was 
also selected as the third choice in one of these instances). Thus, for Scenario 2A, there were 
three instances out of a possible 36 in which more than one response was deemed to be 
appropriate.  
Taken together, the results indicate a strong preference for the necessity modals, as 
predicted for necessity contexts. The higher preference for the have to formulation in 
Scenario 4A is attributed to the father’s annoyance, which is likely to result in the assumption 
that the negative face saving strategies have been suspended.  
 
Conditions I and II: Compared responses 
A Fisher’s Exact test revealed a reliable difference in preferred response to the question – i.e. 
could, should, or have to – between participants in Conditions I and II (p < 0.0001), with the 
could formulation being preferred among participants in Condition I, the material 
interpretation (75.7%), and the have to formulation being preferred among participants in 
Condition II, the biconditional interpretation (69.6%) (see Table 3).  
18 
 
Table 3 
 could 
 
should have to 
Condition I 
(Scenarios 1A and 2A) 
75.7% 20.0% 4.3% 
Condition II 
(Scenarios 3A and 4A) 
0.0% 30.4% 69.6% 
 
The results of Experiment 1 corroborate our hypothesis that modals used in indirect reports of 
‘if p, q’ conditionals co-vary with the number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways. 
This indicates that root modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals may be a 
diagnostic for biconditional versus material interpretations of conditional advice and 
inducement. With respect to our initial predictions, the number of have to formulations in 
necessity contexts is slightly higher than we expected (we expected more should 
formulations) and may be due to the fact that our scenarios involved asymmetric parent-child 
contexts.  
 
6. Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the results of Experiment 1 could be 
replicated in contexts which lower/eliminate the believability of the conditionals by invoking 
dubious CNC states. A positive answer would increase the reliability of the results from 
Experiment 1. A further set of questions that we were interested in was whether (i) the 
propositional attitude of belief of S’ in the truth of U (or, more specifically, in the truth of the 
thought communicated by U) affects the choice of U’ and whether (ii) the propositional 
attitude of belief of S in the truth of their own U – as assumed by S’ – affects the choice of 
U’. We hypothesised that (i) and (ii) will have no effect on U’. If corroborated, the hypothesis 
would suggest that, when the reporting verb say is used by S’, there should be no theoretical 
expectation that a successful indirect report will result in a belief attribution by H’ to S.   
 
6.1. Method 
Participants 
160 native English speakers participated in this study (42 in Scenario 1B; 34 in Scenario 2B; 
44 in Scenario 3B; 40 in Scenario 4B). 82 participants were female, 71 were male, 2 were 
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non-binary, and 5 were non-specified. There was an age range of 18 to 67 years and a mean 
age of 32 years. Participants were recruited online via social media postings. No participant 
had studied linguistics or philosophy beyond MA level. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The study was comprised of four surveys (Scenario 1B, Scenario 2B, Scenario 3B, and 
Scenario 4B), which were created using Google Forms. The social media postings advertising 
the study contained hyperlinks to each survey. Participants were instructed to take part in just 
one of the surveys. 
On the opening page, participants were informed that the study formed part of a larger 
investigation into the reporting of other people’s speech. Following informed consent, 
participants proceeded onto the second page, whereby they were presented with one test 
question: 
Condition I: several alternative antecedents 
Scenario 1B: Paul wants to buy his friend, Mary, a birthday present. He knows that Mary 
doesn’t like it when people buy her books, but that’s about the only relevant thing he knows. 
He decides to consult Mary’s sister, Joanne. Joanne tells Paul about the many hobbies that 
Mary has, such as good literature, classical music, horse-riding and hiking. She then says to 
John: 
If you buy Mary a good book, she’ll be happy. 
Surprised at Joanne’s unawareness, Paul wants to tell Frank, his roommate, what Joanne said. 
Which of the following sentences would Paul be most likely to use? You can tick more than 
one if you feel it’s appropriate – if so, please indicate your first/second/third choice.  
a) Joanne said that I could buy Mary a book if I want to make her happy. 
b) Joanne said that I should buy Mary a book if I want to make her happy. 
c) Joanne said that I have to buy Mary a book if I want to make her happy. 
Scenario 2B: Tom is at his Grandma’s and he’s looking for a way to earn £5. Grandma tells 
Tom that there are many things he could do to earn £5, such as vacuuming, doing the laundry, 
doing the dishes, mowing the lawn or doing the shopping. She then says to Tom: 
If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you £5. 
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Tom knows that his Grandma is lying – she’s so stingy that she has never ever kept a promise 
to give someone money. He wants to tell his mum what Grandma said. Which of the 
following sentences would Tom be most likely to use? You can tick more than one if you feel 
it’s appropriate – if so, please indicate your first/second/third choice.   
a) Grandma said that I could mow the lawn if I want to earn £5. 
b) Grandma said that I should mow the lawn if I want to earn £5. 
c) Grandma said that I have to mow the lawn if I want to earn £5. 
Condition II: no alternative antecedents  
Scenario 3B: Little Bill is irritated. He’s kept a pot of water near the fire for an hour, 
thinking that the water would boil. But it didn’t. His mum says: 
If you heat the water up to 80°C – which is 176°F –, it’ll boil.  
Little Bill knows that his mum is wrong. He’s been learning at school about the boiling point 
of water. He just thought that keeping a pot of water near the fire for an hour will heat it up to 
100°C. Little Bill wants to tell his friend what his mum said. Which of the following 
sentences would Bill be most likely to use? You can tick more than one if you feel it’s 
appropriate – if so, please indicate your first/second/third choice.     
a) Mum said that I could heat the water up to 80°C/176°F if I want it to boil. 
b) Mum said that I should heat the water up to 80°C/176°F if I want it to boil.  
c) Mum said that I have to heat the water up to 80°C/176°F if I want it to boil. 
Scenario 4B: A teenage girl wants to go out. Her father, annoyed with the constant mess in 
the girl’s room, says: 
    If you clean your room, I’ll let you go out. 
The teenager isn’t sure whether to trust her father on this. After all she’s only 15 and he and 
mum made it clear that there’s no going out until she’s 18. She is on the phone with her 
friend. She wants to tell her friend what her father said. Which of the following sentences 
would the teenager be most likely to use? You can tick more than one if you feel it’s 
appropriate – if so, please indicate your first/second/third choice.   
a) My father said that I could clean my room if I want to go out. 
b) My father said that I should clean my room if I want to go out. 
c) My father said that I have to clean my room if I want to go out. 
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Immediately below, participants provided their answer to the test question and any other 
comments which they might have (marked as optional). 
On the final page, participants provided demographic information: age, gender, native 
language(s), and country of residence. They then indicated whether or not they had studied 
linguistics and/or philosophy at university level and, if so, their highest level of study. All 
participants confirmed that they had taken part in just one of the surveys. 
 
Predictions 
We hypothesise that manipulating the believability variable will have no effect on the choice 
of the modalised report. That is, we predict that there will be no reliable differences between 
answers to scenarios A used in Experiment 1 and their counterparts B used in Experiment 2.  
 
6.2. Results and discussion  
Condition I: material interpretation (Scenarios 1B and 2B) 
(i) Preferred response: In line with our predictions, a chi-square goodness of fit test revealed a 
reliable difference in preferred response to the question – i.e. could, should, or have to – 
among participants responding to Scenario 1B (χ2 (2,42) = 30.14; p < 0.0001), as well as 
participants responding to Scenario 2B (χ2 (2,34) = 12.41; p = 0.002) (see Table 4). 
Specifically, as predicted, for both scenarios, participants demonstrated a preference for the 
could formulation, which we attribute to sufficiency, but not necessity, of p for the truth of q, 
which results from the foregrounding of many alternative causes.  
Table 4 
 could 
 
should have to 
Scenario 1B 
 
69.0% 31.0% 0.0% 
Scenario 2B 
 
61.8% 17.6% 20.6% 
 
(ii) Multiple responses: As mentioned, participants were given the option of selecting more 
than one response if they thought it was appropriate. When doing so, they were asked to 
indicate their first/second/third choices. 
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For Scenario 1B, the findings revealed that, in three instances where could was 
indicated as the preferred choice, should was selected as the second choice. Moreover, in two 
instances where should was indicated as the preferred choice, could was selected as the 
second choice. Thus, for Scenario 1B, there were five instances out of a possible 42 in which 
more than one response was deemed to be appropriate.  
  For Scenario 2B, the findings revealed that, in three instances and one instance where 
could was indicated as the preferred choice, should and have to were selected as the second 
choice, respectively. Moreover, in one instance where have to was indicated as the preferred 
choice, could was selected as the second choice. Taken together, for Scenario 2B, there were 
five instances out of a possible 34 in which more than one response was deemed to be 
appropriate. 
Taken together, the results indicate a significant preference for the could formulation, 
which was predicted as a favoured choice for sufficiency contexts.  
 
Condition II: biconditional interpretation (Scenarios 3B and 4B) 
(i) Preferred response: In line with our predictions, a chi-square goodness of fit test revealed a 
reliable difference in preferred response to the question – i.e. could, should, or have to – 
among participants responding to Scenario 3B (χ2 (2,44) = 14.67; p =  0.0009), as well as 
participants responding to Scenario 4B (χ2 (2,40) = 49.4; p < 0.0001) (see Table 5). 
Specifically, as predicted, for Scenario 3B, participants demonstrated a preference for the 
should formulation and, for Scenario 4B, participants demonstrated a preference for the have 
to formulation. We attribute these choices to the necessity of p for the truth of q.  
Table 5 
 could 
 
should have to 
Scenario 3B 6.8% 
 
47.7% 45.5% 
Scenario 4B 0.0% 
 
15.0% 85.0% 
 
(ii) Multiple responses: As mentioned, participants were given the option of selecting more 
than one response if they thought it was appropriate. When doing so, they were asked to 
indicate their first/second/third choices. 
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For Scenario 3B, the findings revealed that, in three instances and two instances 
where should was indicated as the preferred choice, have to and could were selected as the 
second choice, respectively. Moreover, in five instances and one instance where have to was 
indicated as the preferred choice, should and could were selected as the second choice, 
respectively. Taken together, for Scenario 3B, there were 11 instances out of a possible 44 in 
which more than one response was deemed to be appropriate. 
  For Scenario 4B, the findings revealed that, in three instances where have to was 
indicated as the preferred choice, should was selected as the second choice. Moreover, in two 
instances where should was indicated as the preferred choice, have to was selected as the 
second choice (and could was also selected as the third choice in 1 of these instances). Thus, 
for Scenario 4B, there were five instances out of a possible 40 in which more than one 
response was deemed to be appropriate.  
Taken together, the results indicate a strong preference for the necessity modals, as 
predicted for necessity contexts.  
 
Conditions I and II: Compared responses  
A Fisher’s Exact test revealed a reliable difference in preferred response to the question – i.e. 
could, should, or have to – between participants in Conditions I and II (p < 0.0001), with the 
could formulation being preferred among participants in Condition I, the material 
interpretation (65.8%), and the have to formulation being preferred among participants in 
Condition II, the biconditional interpretation (64.3%) (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
 could 
 
should have to 
Condition I 
(Scenarios 1B and 2B) 
65.8% 
 
25.0% 
 
9.2% 
 
Condition II 
(Scenarios 3B and 4B) 
3.6% 
 
32.1% 
 
64.3% 
 
 
Experiments 1 and 2: Compared responses 
All conditionals used in Experiment 1 were assumed to be believable for the reasons 
discussed earlier. The contexts in which the conditionals in Experiment 2 were uttered were 
manipulated so as to lower/eliminate their believability. In Scenario 1B, we learn that the 
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reporting speaker S’ assumes that the reported speaker S is unaware that what she said is 
false. However, the information that S’ is surprised at the reported speaker’s unawareness, 
and the earlier suggestion that S’ does not have much relevant information about Mary, may 
introduce some doubt about the correctness of the reporting speaker’s assumption. In 
Scenario 2B, the reporting speaker S’ assumes that the original speaker has lied. The 
correctness of the reporting speaker’s assumption is supported with the negative affect 
expressions so stingy and never ever. In Scenario 3B, the reporting speaker S’ knows that 
what S said was false and that S is unaware that what she said is false. Nothing in this 
scenario casts doubt on the correctness of the reporting speaker’s assumption. In Scenario 4B, 
S’ is not sure whether what S said was true or false. The variation in believability for these 
scenarios is summarised in Table 7 below.   
Table 7 
 Condition I 
Sufficiency of p for q 
Condition II 
Necessity of p for q 
Advice   1B: U may be false 3B: U is false  
Inducement  2B: U is false  4B: U may be false 
 
As discussed earlier, we are interested in whether (i) the belief of S’ in the truth of U has any 
effect on the choice of U’. All scenarios used will provide some insight into this question; 
from the perspective of S’, in 1B S may be holding a false belief (about what her sister would 
like), in 3B S is holding a false belief (about the boiling point of water), in 2B S is lying 
(about rewarding the grandson with money) and in 4B S may be lying (about letting the 
daughter go out). Additionally, we are also interested in whether (ii) the belief of S in the 
truth of U – as assumed by S’ – has any reliable effect on the choice of U’. Here, scenario 2B 
will be crucial as, from the perspective of S’, it involves a lie. Scenario 4B will also be 
relevant here as it involves a potential lie.  
As predicted, a Fisher’s Exact test revealed no reliable differences between answers to 
scenarios A used in Experiment 1 and their counterparts B used in Experiment 2 (p > 0.05). 
The overall findings are illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
The parity between the responses to counterpart scenarios in the two experiments indicates 
that neither the belief of S’ in the truth of U, nor the belief of S in the truth of U – as assumed 
by S’ – has any reliable effect on the choice of U’. This result raises the following question: 
when the reporting verb say is used by S’, should there be a theoretical expectation that a 
successful modalised indirect report of a conditional U will result in a belief attribution by H’ 
to S? It seems to us that whereas it can be assumed that a successful modalised indirect report 
of a conditional U with the reporting verb say will result in a thought attribution by H’ to S 
(attribution of a thought assumed to be communicated by the original U), it cannot be 
assumed that it will necessarily result in a belief attribution by H’ to S. Whether it does or 
does not depends on tacit assumptions, or otherwise, of cooperation, sincerity and normality 
(e.g. Searle 1969; Grice 1986; Politzer 2004).   
This result is not surprising if one agrees that is not clear whether the verb say should 
be classed as a propositional attitude verb (e.g. Capone 2013; but see Richard 2006), an issue 
which is linked more broadly to the classification of predicates into factive and non-factive 
(e.g. Hazlett 2010) and, even more broadly, to context-dependence of heteroglossia (e.g. 
Martin & White 2005). Indeed, the result follows from the assumption that the verb say is 
neutral with respect to (i.e. can be used to communicate a variety of) the reporting speaker’s, 
and, to some extent, the reported speaker’s, cognitive attitudes to U.   
More specifically, the fact that a modalised indirect report of a conditional U with the 
reporting verb say is neutral in the above sense is linked to the fact that we process and 
interpret conditionals under different cognitive conditions, including certainty and degrees of 
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uncertainty. Crucially, as the hearer of U, S’ does not have to believe that the major premise 
of a conditional U is true in order to be able to reason on the assumption of its truth and, 
given such an assumption, entertain – though not accept – the conclusions of inferences 
afforded by material or biconditional interpretations. This fundamental ability to reason from 
a conditional U on the assumption of its truth is why S’ does not have to believe in the truth 
of U to be able to transform a conditional U into a modalised report U’ as if S’ believed that 
U was true.  
In our view, the findings of Experiment 2 draw attention to what seems to have been 
generally neglected by probability approaches to conditionals but what is potentially an 
important element in understanding the role of conditionals in our lives – the fact that we can 
process them on the assumption of the truth of the major premise and the related ability to 
entertain conclusions of classical inferences without necessarily accepting them.  
 
7. A note on the speech act variable  
The question of whether the number of alternative antecedents has an effect on the modalised 
reports of conditionals was the main research question in this study. However, because our 
participants were working with conditional advice and conditional inducements across both 
conditions, I and II, in both experiments, it is also relevant to ask whether the speech act 
variable had any effect on the modalised formulation choices.  
A Fisher’s Exact test also revealed a reliable difference in preferred response to the 
question – i.e. could, should, or have to – between participants in the advice conditions and 
those in the inducement conditions: Scenarios 1A and 2A (p = 0.002), Scenarios 1B and 2B 
(p = 0.005), Scenarios 3A and 4A (p < 0.001), and Scenarios 3B and 4B (p < 0.001) (see 
Table 8). 
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Table 8   
  could 
 
should have to 
Condition I: 
material 
interpretation  
Scenario 1A 65.7% 34.3% 0.0% 
Scenario 2A 85.7% 5.7% 8.6% 
Scenario 1B 69.0% 31.0% 0.0% 
Scenario 2B 61.8% 17.6% 20.6% 
Condition II: 
biconditional 
interpretation 
Scenario 3A 0.0% 51.5% 48.5% 
Scenario 4A 0.0% 11.1% 88.9% 
Scenario 3B 6.8% 47.7% 45.5% 
Scenario 4B 0.0% 15.0% 85.0% 
 
Let us start with Condition I (scenarios 1 and 2). In Experiment 1, the could formulation was 
more frequent in the inducement scenario (2A) than in the advice scenario (1A), which might 
be taken to suggest that alternative antecedents are more prominent with conditional 
inducements than they are with conditional advice. However, in Experiment 2, could was 
actually slightly more frequent for advice (1B) than for inducement (2B). So, whereas 
Experiments 1 and 2 both show a reliable difference in the formulation choices for advice 
versus inducement, the pattern for could is opposite. Having said that, at a more coarse-
grained level, taken together, the could and should formulations – which are consistent with 
many alternative antecedents and the better and worse alternatives contexts (see section 3) – 
tend to be chosen more frequently for advice (1A and 1B) than for inducements (2A and 2B).  
In Condition II, there is a very clear patterning with the have to formulation being 
more frequent for inducement than for advice in both experiments. However, it is not clear 
whether this effect is due to the speech act variable or due to the suspension of the negative 
face-want strategies (because of the father’s annoyance).  
In summary, whereas significant effects have been observed for the speech act 
variable, more experimental work is needed to eliminate any potential confounds.  
 
8. Conclusion 
We have found that modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals co-vary with the 
number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways, which suggests that modals used in 
indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals may be a diagnostic for biconditional versus material 
28 
 
interpretations of conditionals. In particular, the could formulation is preferred when many 
alternative antecedents are foregrounded (the material interpretation) whereas the have to 
formulation is preferred in contexts where there are no alternative antecedents (the 
biconditional interpretation). It was also found that lowering/eliminating the believability of 
the conditionals has no significant effect on the results. We believe that this result highlights 
the significance of the cognisers’ ability to entertain conclusions of classical inferences on the 
assumption of the truth of the major premise even if they do not believe in the truth of the 
major premise.  
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